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ABSTRACT.
Discussions on cooperative security strategies in Southeast Asia often mention potential threats such as piracy, 
illegal fishing, terrorism, island disputes and even the security concerns posed by natural disasters.  The 
aforementioned threats are mutual, between not only the ten ASEAN countries but also neighbors, such as 
Australia and Timor Leste, along with rising and global powers such as China and the United States.  However, 
developing security cooperation even against mutual threats is hindered not only by geographic and monetary 
restraints but by differences in national ideology, national interests, differing historical perspectives, divergent 
legal opinions as well as intentional and unintentional misinformation. Using the perspective of a multi-discipline 
approach to international relations realism and the security dilemma along with highlighting the sources of 
miscommunication that hinder long-term security cooperation, this paper argues that Indonesia and the US 
have incorrect and sometimes dangerous perceptions of the other.  Differing concepts on national sovereignty, 
interpretations of international law and the degradation of the rules-based order are all easily manipulated to 
fuel dangerous misperceptions.  Cooperation and sovereignty seem more at odds than ever before. But military 
cooperation can still be successful using honest assessments that avoid false information and instead pursue 
sincere engagements.  
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KEDAULATAN, NORMA-NORMA GLOBAL DAN KERJA SAMA KEAMANAN DI 
ASIA TENGGARA
ABSTRAK.
Diskusi tentang strategi keamanan kooperatif di Asia Tenggara sering menyebutkan potensi ancaman seperti 
pembajakan, penangkapan ikan ilegal, terorisme, sengketa pulau dan bahkan masalah keamanan yang 
ditimbulkan oleh bencana alam. Ancaman tersebut adalah saling berkaitan, tidak hanya di antara sepuluh negara 
ASEAN tetapi juga negara tetangga, seperti Australia dan Timor Leste, bersama dengan kekuatan global yang 
meningkat seperti Republik Rakyat Tiongkok (RRT) dan Amerika Serikat. Namun, mengembangkan kerja sama 
keamanan bahkan terhadap ancaman-ancaman timbal balik tidak hanya dibatasi oleh pembatasan geografis 
dan moneter tetapi juga oleh perbedaan dalam ideologi nasional, kepentingan nasional, perspektif sejarah yang 
berbeda, opini hukum yang berbeda, serta kesalahan informasi yang disengaja dan tidak disengaja. Menggunakan 
perspektif pendekatan multi-disiplin untuk realisme hubungan internasional dan dilema keamanan bersama 
dengan menyoroti sumber miskomunikasi yang menghambat kerja sama keamanan jangka panjang, makalah 
ini berpendapat bahwa Indonesia dan AS memiliki persepsi yang salah dan kadang-kadang berbahaya dari yang 
lain. Konsep yang berbeda tentang kedaulatan nasional, interpretasi hukum internasional dan degradasi aturan 
berbasis aturan semuanya mudah dimanipulasi untuk menyulut kesalahpahaman yang berbahaya. Kerja sama 
dan kedaulatan tampaknya lebih berselisih daripada sebelumnya. Tetapi kerjasama militer masih bisa berhasil 
dengan menggunakan penilaian jujur  yang menghindari informasi palsu dan malah mengejar keterlibatan yang 
tulus.
Kata kunci: kedaulatan; Indonesia; UNCLOS; strategi pertahanan; dilema keamanan; kerja sama keamanan
INTRODUCTION
Discussions on cooperative security stra-
tegies in Southeast Asia often mention potential 
threats such as piracy, illegal fishing, terrorism, 
island disputes and even the security concerns 
posed by natural disasters. The aforementioned 
threats are mutual, between not only the ten 
ASEAN countries but also neighbors, such as 
Australia and Timor Leste along with rising and 
global powers such as China and the United 
States. However, developing security cooperation 
even against mutual threats is hindered not only 
by geographic and monetary restraints but 
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by differences in national ideology, national 
interests, differing historical perspectives, 
divergent legal opinions as well as intentional 
and unintentional misinformation.  The factors 
that influence and challenge Indonesian and 
American security cooperation include all of the 
above.  
Parsimonious international relations theories 
do not always consider the complex political, 
economic, historical and even psychological 
environment that leads to misperceptions of 
strategy not only between partner nations, but 
also allied ones.  Robert Jervis is well known 
for advancing a multi-discipline approach to 
international relations realism and the security 
dilemma while highlighting the sources of 
miscommunication that hinder long-term 
security cooperation. 
This paper will begin with a theoretical 
discussion on Indonesian-US security coo-
peration citing recent scholar reflections on 
Robert Jervis’ work.  Second, the essay will 
briefly outline US military activities and history 
in East Asia along with Indonesia’s security 
priorities.  In addition to theory on security 
cooperation in general, the author applies key 
research findings from studying and observing 
Indonesian military strategy as a Sekolah Staf dan 
Komando Angkatan Udara (SESKOAU) student 
throughout the 2018 academic year.  This paper 
is made possible by the openness of Indonesia’s 
highest military academic institutions and its 
graciousness as a host and partner.  
This paper argues that Indonesia and the 
US have incorrect and sometimes dangerous 
perceptions of the other most often caused 
by poor security analysis. Overall, differing 
concepts on national sovereignty, interpretations 
of international law and the degradation of the 
rules-based order are all easily manipulated to 
fuel dangerous misperceptions.  The security 
examples and approach used in this paper were 
selected to address some of the most frequent 
topics of discussion in the SESKOAU classrooms 
and lecture halls, which are themselves pre-
occupations of Indonesia’s military headquarters. 
Robert Jervis’ writings on the security 
dilemma and security cooperation have been 
re-read, analyzed and updated for decades. 
Editor James Davis’ 2013 contribution com-
bines a number of security scholars from 
different disciplines to discuss the continuing 
merit and contemporary application of Jervis’ 
arguments. The security dilemma claims that 
when one country increases its military posture, 
neighboring countries, regardless of diplomatic 
relations are compelled to do the same.  How-
ever, Jervis contends that certain types of military 
actions and equipment build-up that is defensive 
in nature, need not always signal an offensive 
intent.
At the same time, defensive realists often 
maintain that the, “Intentions and preferences of 
others” cannot be known for certain. In this global 
anarchic environment, perceptions and mis-
perceptions are the main hurdles to cooperation 
and drivers of insecurity (Snyder, 2013: 14).  The 
complex system of interaction, perception and 
mis-communication is made worse through the 
use of and claims to guile and deception.  Even 
if cultural, political and economic conditions in 
a multi-discipline understanding of security do 
influence cooperation, there are also universal 
human factors, temptations to biases, “cognitive 
shortcuts” that we all use to miscalculate the 
dangers of a potential adversary while at the 
same time underestimating our own ability 
against it (Snyder, 2013: 17).  
The condition above, while not a cohesive 
theory, can be summarized as follows, “Under 
conditions of complexity and uncertainty, 
people operate according to the “cognitive 
miser” model, using devices such as rigid 
belief systems, cognitive biases, heuristics, 
and other shortcuts to simplify one’s choice 
and assessment (Schweller, 2013: 27).” Cross-
cultural engagements in different languages, 
different historical experiences, different national 
ideologies and foreign relations strategies 
combined with what constructivists call created 
national identities create an environment ripe for 
misperception and unintended conflict.  How 
can the Indonesian-US security cooperation 
environment avoid these pitfalls?  
Source: The Heritage Foundation
Table 1. Comulative U.S. troop deployments by re-
gion and decade
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Let us first take history into account.  The 
US military as an expeditionary global force is 
fundamentally different than militaries that are 
largely defensive in nature. On the opposite 
spectrum of the expeditionary force concept are 
militaries contained by foreign policies of non-
intervention, as is Indonesia’s military (TNI). 
The US military presence in East and Southeast 
Asia is not a recent or sudden development.  The 
US military posture is largely influenced by 
the aftermath of WWII. The most US military 
personnel ever deployed overseas in a year 
occurred in 1968, a total of 1,082,777 personnel. 
At the US military’s lowest overseas presence 
in 1999, 206,002 personnel were deployed 
(Kane, 2003). Since this 2003 data set, military 
personnel deployments continue to experience a 
downward trend.    
The East Asian perspective is important 
because as the US military continues to draw 
down its troops overseas, closing 22 units in 
Germany and three in Italy, East Asian military 
numbers remained relatively the same (Feickert, 
2014). A 2013 Rand study concluded that the US 
is best served with a smaller military footprint, 
more agile, more advanced, able to react quickly 
against threats to US interest while awaiting 
assistance from partners, allies and additional air-
sea lift of US troops (Lostumbo et al, 2013).  US 
military presence in places like Korea and Japan 
factor into the host nation’s defense capabilities. 
Currently, there are roughly 154,000 US troops 
in Asia, including five aircraft carrier strike 
groups (Glaser, 2017).  
Recent US troop drawdowns mean that the 
US military can be more efficient and flexible but 
also means that it relies on allies and partners for 
access. The US posture, in short, requires greater 
cooperation.  This cooperation is reflected in a 
US military rotational presence in places like 
Darwin Australia, the Philippines and Singapore. 
As mentioned by the 2013 Rand study, “The 
United States is trying to increase the level and 
sophistication of activities with those countries 
and other regional partners.”  In terms of security 
priorities, Southeast Asia still falls below the 
Korean Peninsula and treaty obligations to Japan. 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy, however, 
signal an important development.
The 2018 US Defense Strategy begins 
by stating that the long-standing rules-based 
international order is crumbling. This rules-
based or norms-based order includes respecting 
customary international law of the seas. At 
least since 2001, the US has cited international 
terrorism as the main global threat.  However, 
the new US Defense Strategy states that “Inter-
state strategic competition”, is the primary 
contemporary security challenge, naming China 
and Russia. The security cooperation the US 
seeks in Southeast Asia is meant to directly 
decrease the military and even economic 
influence of China in the region; to prevent 
the spread of China’s authoritarian ideology 
and regional hegemony. In addition, the US, as 
opposed to China, rallies for transparency in the 
peaceful resolution of East Asian disputes.  
Such a “complex global security environ-
ment” is ripe for misperception according 
Jervis’s theoretical arguments. Ironically, 
while the condition makes cooperation more 
difficult, cooperation itself increases in priority. 
The military posture in the 2018 Defense 
Strategy states as its objective, “Defending 
allies from military aggression and bolstering 
partners against coercion, and fairly sharing 
responsibilities for common defense”.  
Tyson Wetzel of the US Air Force explains 
that from a national, US military perspective, the 
“Dynamic Force Employment” concept in the 
2018 Defense Strategy will be difficult to execute 
(2018).  It calls for less predictable deployment 
locations and timetables which make unit and 
individual preparedness a physical and emotional 
challenge. Tyson provides the example of three 
agile carrier fleets, sailing between the Indian 
Ocean, South and East China Seas with scant 
forewarning before changes in direction. The 
military presence is meant to assure allies and 
deter Chinese aggression, signaling that the US 
is ready for any contingency.  However, their 
main purpose is peace, stability and a rules-
based order.
Aside from the internal military preparedness 
challenge, the Dynamic Force Employment 
concept, despite an emphasis on partner and ally 
support, according to Jervis’s foundational ideas, 
is extremely challenging in terms of cooperation. 
Each partner and ally have their own political, 
cultural and historical influences that make such 
dynamic forms of cooperation a foreign policy 
behemoth.  Indonesia is a prime example. 
METHODOLOGY
This paper builds on a literature study 
procedure that emphasizes contemporary 
security discourse in the Southeast Asian 
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region, especially Indonesia. The analytical 
perspective used in this paper is taken from 
the construction of the theory of international 
relations realism and the shared security 
dilemma that was built by Robert Jarvis. 
Most of the data taken come from documents 
that reveal the distribution of the placement 
of US troops in Southeast Asia which is then 
compared to similar documents from the 
Indonesian version. The effort aims to examine 
areas that allow ongoing miscommunication 
between countries, thus causing dangerous 
misperceptions.
DISCUSSION
Indonesia’s Security Priorities
The 2018 Defense Strategy states that, 
“Today, every domain is contested—air, land, 
sea, space, and cyberspace.” Meaning, US will 
face stronger resistance in deploying where and 
when desired. Indonesia’s specific interpretation 
of UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea) is directly involved in this 
growing concern.  Indonesia’s 17,000 islands 
and atolls have been declared an archipelagic 
state, which according to Elson (2009), is one 
more step in Indonesia’s project of identity 
creation. Indonesia’s internal security depends 
on unity between hundreds of people groups 
and languages, bound in a national language and 
ideology, Pancasila.  
This author has argued in other publications 
(Slayton, 2018) that Indonesia’s military also 
deeply fears foreign meddling in the form of 
hybrid, irregular warfare; intent on purposely 
disrespecting Indonesia’s sovereignty and 
gaining access to its resources. Indonesia’s 
sovereignty project has expanded to declare 
Indonesia as a maritime fulcrum, writing policy 
and government directives defining not only 
archipelagic borders but strict waterway and 
airspace regulations above land and on water. 
Indonesian Air Defense Command claimed 
that in 2015 there were over 140 violation of 
Indonesian air space, the majority of them 
committed by US military and civilian aircraft 
(“Sepanjang 2015 ada 140 pelanggaran udara”; 
2015, 8 Dec).  
As scholar Evan Laksmana argues (2018), 
the main concern against Indonesia’s recent air 
space regulations and even a number of their 
UNCLOS interpretations as applied to sea lanes, 
is that they have been unilateral decisions.  There 
was little to no advance notice or negotiation 
with Indonesia’s neighbors, or the United States, 
against whom the most airspace violations are 
registered.  The latest 2018 Air Space Regulation 
itself has yet to be translated into English by the 
Indonesian government.  
If Indonesia is primarily concerned about 
its archipelagic identity and national sovereignty, 
how does that align with US concerns on China’s 
pursuit of regional hegemony? China’s nine 
dash line does not extend to Indonesia’s northern 
most island, Natuna. However, it does reach into 
Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
which according to UNCLOS extends out to 
200NM beyond a country’s borders. 
President Obama’s US pivot (now called 
rebalance) to Asia did “dovetail” with President 
Jokowi’s aspirations for a Global Maritime 
Fulcrum (Harding & Natalegawa, 2018).  The clash 
is about power projection but also interpretations 
of sovereignty, definitions of UNCLOS and the 
complex competitive economic environment. 
The mutual interest of all remains the same, a 
peaceful resolution of disputed island claims and 
a mutual respect of individual EEZs.  
Jervis in Relation to ASEAN
The US Defense Strategy doesn’t simply 
balance power, it balances a specific threat. 
The 2018 strategy calls for the, “Free and open 
access to common domains” with obvious 
reference to South China Sea (SCS) waters but 
also more liberal interpretations of Indonesia’s 
sea lane and airspace regulations, at least until 
multilateral negotiations can come to a mutual 
agreement on such a global strategic location.1 
In addition, Indonesia’s foreign and military 
posture is fundamentally different than that of 
the US.  Indonesia is a founding member of the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which eschews 
alliances and military coalitions, claiming their 
propensity for stirring up aggression.  
The US has been a key Indonesian partner 
since its declared independence in 1945 even if its 
people-to-people and historical interactions have 
not been as strong as that of the US with South 
Korea, Japan, Philippines or Thailand.  In the US 
National Security Strategy (2017), the US seeks 
to strengthen its maritime security partnerships 
specifically with Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore 
1 Indonesia’s airspace and waterways are more crucial to international 
access than say, US air space.  The US ADIZ that surrounds its compact 
land masses can in now way be compared to the island spread of In-
donesia.  Indonesia’s archipelago and the potential of a declared ADIZ 
should not be compared to the US example.  
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and Malaysia; all partners, not US allies. In 
2010, US President Obama and Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed 
a comprehensive partnership to create closer 
Indonesian-US government and economic ties. 
That partnership was upgraded to a strategic 
partnership in 2016.  
Despite this partnership language there 
are a few key people-to-people programs that 
are severely lacking. “Education exchanges are 
miniscule” states a recent CSIS report (Harding 
& Natalegawa, 2018).  The same report highlights 
over 170 annual bilateral military-to-military 
engagements between the US and Indonesia. 
But without quality culture and language 
understanding between the two, it is very easy 
to misinterpret strategy and intent.  Indonesia 
is deeply suspicious of regional coalitions like 
the Five Power Defense Arrangement between 
Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand 
and Britain (Dobell, 2018) and even wary of 
security dialogues like the Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue between the US, India, Australia and 
Japan (Harding & Natalegawa, 2018).  The US 
cannot simply console Indonesia by explaining 
that its fears are unfounded.
Indonesia and even China fire back at the US by 
asking why the US has not ratified UNCLOS, 
even though it still abides by international norms. 
During the US Senate ratification process, some 
senators supported UNCLOS saying that it 
complied with the US concept of EEZs and could 
provide legitimacy to the US in resolving SCS 
disputes.  Senators against UNCLOS ratification 
claimed that China also argues its rights 
according to UNCLOS which means that there 
is still not a universal interpretation of UNCLOS 
standards (O’Rourke, 2018). Indonesia’s own 
interpretations of UNCLOS in relation to its sea 
Picture 1. Location of US Personnel and Bases along 
with Allies
lanes and archipelagic waters clash with almost 
all of its neighbors and the US.2 
Clashes of interpretation then lead to an 
increased perception of threat. Indonesia’s sove-
reignty argument sits at the core of Indonesia’s 
security conc erns and manifests itself in alarming 
ways within Indonesia’s military strategic 
statements and military education curriculum. 
Images like the one on the left would normally 
be dismissed as inflammatory news or at least 
amateur analysis.  However, since this very 
image is frequently shown in the lecture halls of 
Indonesia’s highest military education facilities 
and discussed on Indonesian military blogs it 
needs to be mentioned.3    
Source: FPRI, Felix Chang
Picture 2. Pasific bases and extended presence of 
U.S combat forces
The original map source on this example 
is a website of conspiracy theories to include 
discrediting the 9/11 Twin Towers attacks and 
confirming sightings of UFOs. But like other 
hoax news, the source information evolves.  The 
map initially titled “US Personnel” or “Training 
Exercise location” is overgeneralized to become 
“US Military Base” which is not only purposely 
misleading but dangerously incorrect.  The most 
troubling of these news sites while reminding 
its readers to reject hoax news because it only 
serves to divide Indonesia’s peoples and draw a 
wedge between its people groups, then continues 
by encouraging readers to instead look at the 
foreign threats, quoting national leaders who 
2 For example, Indonesian policy has no horizontal, east-west sea lanes 
across its archipelago but instead only three vertical, north-south passages. 
3 Examples can be found at: http://satoetoedjoehdelapan.blog-
spot.com/2016/06/gawat-indonesia-dikepung-15-pangkalan.
html & https://newsstatusaceh.wordpress.com/2015/12/30/indone-
sia-dikepung-15-pangkalan-militer-asing/ & http://www.batasnegeri.
com/danrem-ingatkan-ancaman-asing-di-wilayah-perbatasan/
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themselves believe that “Indonesia is surrounded 
by the US military” for the possible purpose of 
invasion.  
The map to the right is a better illustration 
of the US’s military presence in Southeast Asia. 
It does not selectively depict US cooperation in 
order to create the appearance of a US imminent 
invasion of Indonesia.  The inflammatory maps 
and blog spots also conveniently ignore the 170 
mil-to-mil engagements between Indonesia and 
the US, which, if included, would clearly show 
Indonesia as a partner in Southeast Asia instead 
of a target.  
The historical, military and political complexity 
evident in Jervis’s ideas have a strong influence on 
security cooperation challenges in Southeast Asia. 
The economic perspective is no less challenging, 
as the recent US-China trade war makes evident. 
Again, referencing viral news and military blog 
spots, the graphic below was shown no less than ten 
times during Air Force Command and Staff College 
lectures, by civilian and military lecturers alike.  
The graphic combines economic coope-
ration with Indonesia’s concern for sovereignty. 
The graphic claims in the title that oil, gas and 
other mining locations are land owned by foreign 
entities.  The more disparaging blogs and news 
sources, along with the Command and Staff 
College narrative, is that Indonesia’s wealth is 
not only being controlled by foreign companies 
but they are encroaching on Indonesia’s land 
sovereignty; an economic and security threat of 
the highest order.4
In the disparaging narrative, rarely is it 
mentioned that the data was from 2012.  Even 
though 50% of the map’s data is obsolete, this 
2012 version is what remains in the 2018 blogs, 
news and school curriculum. There was never 
a discussion on the origins of each business 
agreement nor of the benefit and profit in the form 
of taxes, technology transfers or development 
projects that these cooperation agreements create. 
According to the US Embassy in Jakarta, as an 
example, the cooperation project in Cepu paid $44 
billion in taxes. Exxon alone has donated more 
than $30 million in community projects.  The 
Indonesian Minister of Energy and Resources has 
called American companies the most innovative 
in Indonesia.  These American energy companies 
are also 95% Indonesian staffed. 
While this second graphic went even more 
viral than the first one mentioned, there were 
credible Indonesian news sources that tried to 
correct the misinformation.  Auliani of Kompas 
News (2016) interviewed high ranking officials 
who were able to dispel the rumor of “foreign 
4 Examples can be found here: https://www.faktajabar.co.id/soal-indone-
sia-bubar-begini-wanti-wanti-gatot/ & https://asiswanto.net/?page_id=312 
Picture 3. U.S and other states owned oil, mineral, and gas fields in Indonesia
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land ownership” and the raping of Indonesian 
wealth.  The most important item to mention is 
that the vast majority of Indonesia’s gas and oil 
fields are Indonesian owned, none of which is 
depicted on the map.  
Cooperation takes at least two sides. 
Beyond the US’s new defense strategy that could 
easily exacerbate the challenge to cooperation, 
US news outlets and the general American 
public have a myopic vision of Indonesia 
or are completely ignorant of the strategic 
partner all together. US and international news 
outlets routinely carry themes such as religious 
persecution, natural disasters, terrorism and 
human rights violations as valid descriptions of 
Indonesia’s people and identity.  
These historical, political and economic 
interpretations have a direct influence on the 
success or failure of cooperation. The Indonesian-
US context is exactly the complex environment 
that Jervis describes as ripe for unintentional 
misunderstandings.  
Challenges for ASEAN Region Cooperation
Indonesia’s military policies are trending 
towards tighter sovereignty regulations while the 
US’s deployment activities to East and Southeast 
Asia become more unpredictable. Many com-
mentators, including Tyson Wetzel quoted 
previously, make it clear that the US needs to 
communicate its strategy clearly with treaty 
partners such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, 
Thailand and the Philippines.  Partner countries 
like Vietnam and Singapore will also be keen to 
understand how the US’s new defense strategy 
will affect US military training cooperation and 
port calls in their naval installations.  But what 
has not been mentioned as frequently is the 
2018 Defense Strategy’s impact on Indonesia, a 
strategic partner.  
Indonesia may not see China’s influence 
in the same fashion as the US does.  Indonesia’s 
own record in combined military operations is 
scant.  According to Ely Ratner (2013), if the 
US pushes its allies and partners too hard against 
China, the US could lose support from those same 
partners. If US partnerships are seen as merely a 
“Trojan horse” against Chinese influence, then 
the US will no longer be perceived as a sincere 
cooperation partner. Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia is a mismatch of perceptions both economic 
and ideological.  Indonesia is not the only 
country in the South China Sea waters seeking to 
increase sovereignty rights into the EEZs. China, 
Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia all 
have different strategies and interpretations of 
UNCLOS.  
The complex security environment brings 
in a psychological influence that manifests 
itself differently from one state to the next. 
Scapegoating is a common strategy between 
disputing countries and the US is a common 
target. Because Southeast Asia has been the 
target of some of the most damaging forms 
of statecraft and deception in the past, super 
powers like the US are not always trusted at face 
value.  Too often, bureaucratic, diplomatic and 
administration mistakes made by US officials 
are not seen as mistakes but instead calculated 
tactics.  The US gets too much credit for always 
doing what it means to do.  This means one 
crucial piece to any relationship, apology and 
reconciliation, is almost impossible without at 
least minor retribution. 
It would seem that in the complex 
environment of Jervis’s perception and misper-
ception, politics loses the ability to accept and 
give a sincere apology.  For that, we are all at fault.
How to overcome the Challenge?
The 2018 National Defense Strategy 
offers these suggestions in maintaining good 
cooperation with partners: giving a clear and 
consistent message to partners and modernizing 
partners to better synergize with US equipment. 
Another message that needs to be sent and 
received clearly is how the US intends to use 
its foreign bases and access. Foreign basing 
and partner nation access have been statistically 
proven to increase military cooperation and build 
more cohesive multinational military capabilities 
for all involved.  “Forces based overseas benefit 
from the interoperability and adaptability skills 
and the greater cultural awareness gained from 
more frequent training with foreign partners. 
These skills are also important for U.S.-
based forces to develop through rotational 
and temporary deployments (Lostumbo et al., 
2013).”
Foreign basing and rotations greatly 
enhance partnerships, cooperation and mutual 
understanding. Even if Indonesia is not a host to 
long-term US troop rotations, they benefit from 
US rotational presence in Singapore, Thailand, 
Philippines, Australia and other seafaring units, 
because they make possible more frequent mil-
to-mil engagements and more robust multilateral 
exercises with Indonesia.
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If US partners like Indonesia are hearing 
the US military’s clear strategy for foreign 
deployments and rotating Southeast Asian pre-
sence, they are either not listening or not fully 
buying the argument. This is disconcerting 
considering the 170 mil-to-mil engagements last 
year alone with Indonesia which apparently are 
not enough to break through the cultural barriers 
and strategic misperceptions. Those same 170 
engagements would not have been possible 
had the US not had its rotating East Asian and 
ASEAN region presence.  
Perhaps it is not just mil-to-mil engagements 
that break through the “fog of shared misper-
ceptions” but longer, more culturally immersed 
military exchange tours (Snyder, pg. 22).  Since 
the 1950s, thousands of Indonesian officers have 
attended training in the US.  Fifty officers by 
2015 had enrolled in 34 US education programs 
(Laksmana, April 2018).  The rate of US officers 
on long-term education programs in Indonesia 
does not fare nearly as well.  In the last ten years, 
the US has sent an Army officer to the Indonesian 
Army Command and Staff School almost every 
year while an Air Force and Navy officer rotate 
every other year in attending their respective 
Indonesian Command and Staff Schools.  Those 
are the same officers, with a few exceptions, 
that return to staff the US Embassy Security 
Cooperation Office in Jakarta and Cooperation 
and Analysis desks in Indo-Pacific Command, 
Hawaii.  One could argue that Indonesia’s military 
knows far more about the US than the US military 
knows about Indonesia.  
While the US strategy will require sincere 
and clear diplomacy in order to maintain its 
Southeast Asian partnerships, Indonesia would 
benefit from Jervis’s advice on choice of military 
weapons (Snyder, pg. 21). Offensive weapons 
must be clearly distinguishable from defensive 
weapons.  The most advanced weapon may not 
only be ineffective in ensuring national defense 
but could be misperceived by a neighbor as a 
military escalation.  Even if Southeast Asia is not 
in danger of starting a weapons race (Laksmana, 
March 2018) as countries like Indonesia replace 
old and obsolete military equipment, they could 
take a lesson from Taiwan.  
Taiwan’s latest defense strategy is not to 
out-number or out-modernize China using the 
latest US technology.  Advanced US weapons 
suites, including the F-35, are, “expensive, 
designed to project power over great distances, 
and maximize mobility and networks to take 
the fight to the enemy with overwhelming 
superiority”. Taiwan, instead, is employing an 
irregular warfare strategy meant to withstand 
attacks in a layered defense. Taiwan is also 
assured US military assistance under the Taiwan 
Relations Act of 1979 should China pursue 
military invasion of Taiwan instead of mutual 
political agreement in order to unite the two 
(Thompson, 2018).  
Indonesia’s military acquisitions program 
must consider not only its domestic production 
capabilities but also a prudent, realistic and 
effective foreign acquisitions program that 
follows the logic framework of a cooperative 
defense plan. An extremely interesting dynamic 
unfolded in the Command and Staff School 
lecture hall when visiting Navy Captain 
(Colonel) Ganif Deswantoro (2018, 15 May) 
asked rhetorically if Indonesia needed (perlu) 
an aircraft carrier.  As if in rehearsed unison, the 
120 Indonesian students shouted “Perlu!” (Yes, 
we need it). Three short weeks later, another 
civilian visiting lecturer asked the same question. 
Without waiting for a response, he answered that 
the aircraft carrier is an offensive weapon; only 
aggressive superpowers buy aircraft carriers 
(Leonard, 2018, 7 June).  This vignette aside, 
Southeast Asian countries do need to consider 
more than the most recent technology for their 
military upgrades.  And it makes a big difference 
whether or not one can depend on a military 
partner or ally when your sovereignty is actually 
under threat. 
According to Evan Laksmana, Indonesia 
does have a diverse line of weapons suppliers from 
32 different countries (18 April 2018).  However, 
what it does not yet have is a defense policy based 
on a coherent strategy, especially when it comes 
to Indonesia’s UNLCOS interpretation of air 
space regulations.  
The US needs to better understand the 
position of its partners, their culture and politics. 
US strategy, regardless of mutual threat, cannot 
simply expect or take for granted security 
cooperation. Diplomatic meetings rarely translate 
to solid cooperation and in the case of Indonesia-
US relations, too much of their interaction is 
based on bureaucratic ritual. As Harding & 
Natalegawa recently confirmed between the 
US and Indonesia, “Official interaction is often 
bureaucratic and rarely strategic.”
Finally, not all bureaucratic, administrative 
or diplomatic mistakes are done on purpose. 
Jervis referred to the difference between “hot 
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cognition” and “cold cognition”, similar to 
motivated and unmotivated bias. Motivated 
bias stems from emotion and poor analysis. 
Unmotivated biases, “Were assumed to constitute 
a form of mistake” (McDermott, pg. 50). 
In the most challenging of environments, 
“Deception is so normal in international politics 
that policy-makers always look for the hidden 
meaning (Mercer, pg. 64).” This psychological 
complex diplomatic environment makes for 
extremely difficult security cooperation where one 
mistake, unintended, is perceived as intentional 
by the partner, who then either moves to exact 
diplomatic punishment or creates temporary 
cooperation barriers to restore the dignity of its 
perceived slight to sovereignty.  
The US 2018 Defense Strategy of quick 
reaction, unannounced deployments and sudden 
military projects, especially throughout South-
east Asia could easily exasperate the security 
cooperation challenge mentioned in this essay, 
despite the fact that the Defense Strategy hinges 
on the very participation of Southeast Asian 
allies and partners.  
CONCLUSION
Differences in culture, history, language and 
above all, a lack of quality analysis means 
that what is perceived as a clear signal by the 
sender can be unclear and confusing to the 
receiver (Mercer, pg. 71). Indonesia’s expanding 
concept of sovereignty, in the form of new air 
space policies, for one, combined with their 
non-aligned (NAM) foreign policy and non-
interventionist intentions can all too easily clash 
with America’s developing concept of defense 
projection. It doesn’t help that diplomatic 
engagements between US leaders and East and 
Southeast Asian leaders leave many strategic 
cooperation questions unanswered.  
It is regrettable and even dangerous how 
influential false news and biased reporting can be 
on military and civilian populations in both the 
US and Southeast Asia.  Military professionals, 
especially, must be armed with analysis skills 
that are not dominated by emotions and can be 
groomed in the lecture halls of quality military 
and civilian institutions. 
Jervis’s description of the complex military coo-
peration environment that incorporates history, 
economy, politics and psychology explains the 
Southeast Asian condition. In this environment, 
selective bias is extremely tempting and it 
makes signaling all the more difficult.  The US’s 
primary approach must prioritize and never 
underestimate sincere communication.  
Finally, expanding concepts of sovereignty 
are exacerbated by the growing violations 
and divergent interpretations of international 
norms.  When states need cooperation the most, 
the environment appears least conducive for 
it. Only honest analysis and consistent, clear 
communication built on strategy-based policies 
can avoid dangerous misperceptions.  
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed 
in this essay are the author’s own and do not 
represent the policy or views of the United States 
government.
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